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Abstract
This study presents an overlapping-generation model featuring probabilistic vot-
ing over two policy issues: pensions and public goods. The results show that as the
population ages, the pension-to-GDP ratio and the growth rate of capital increase,
but the public goods-to-GDP ratio decreases. Moreover, per retiree pension-to-
GDP shows a hump-shaped pattern in response to population aging, but only a
rising phase is valid under empirically plausible parameter values.
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1 Introduction
Many OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries have
experienced declining fertility rates and increasing life expectancy over the past several
decades (OECD, 2011). This demographic change raises the share of the elderly in the
population, which is expected to strengthen their political power in voting. Therefore,
government spending for the elderly, such as on public pensions and long-term care, is
likely to increase. One of the expected side eects of this trend is an increase in the
tax burden on the young, which may result in a declining growth rate over time. This
leads to the following questions: how does an aging population aect the composition
of government expenditures via voting; and how does this change in composition aect
economic growth?
This study investigates the eect of demographic changes on government spending on
pensions and public goods and economic growth. For this purpose, we use an overlapping-
generation model with individuals who live for two periods, youth and old age, and com-
petitive rms endowed with AK technology, as in Romer (1986). Government spending
nanced by a tax on the young, includes providing public goods that benet both popu-
lations, and public pensions that benet the elderly.
To demonstrate intergenerational conict between the two policies, we assume prob-
abilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), where the government's objective is to
maximize the weighted sum of the utility of the young and elderly. We employ a Markov
strategy in which the two policy variables are conditioned on a payo-relevant state vari-
able, that is, the beginning-of-period capital in the present framework. This implies that
the expected levels of public goods and public pensions in the next period depend on the
next-period stock of capital, which is aected by policy decisions in the current period.
Forward-looking individuals consider this intertemporal eect when they vote.
Based on the framework outlined above, we rst characterize a political equilibrium
and show that public pensions are more likely to be provided in equilibrium if the in-
dividual's longevity is higher and/or the population growth rate is lower. Second, the
pension-to-GDP ratio and the growth rate of capital increase, but the public goods-to-
GDP ratio decreases as the population ages. Population aging induces the government
to shift resource allocation from the young to the elderly, but does not hamper economic
growth. Third, per retiree pension-to-GDP shows a hump-shaped pattern in response
to population aging. However, only a rising phase is valid under empirically plausible
parameter values.
The analysis and results from this study contribute to three streams of literature.
First, this study contributes to the conversation around two policy issues, public goods
provision that benets both the young and the elderly and public pensions that benet
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the elderly (Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2007; Creedy and Moslehi, 2009; and
Creedy, Li, and Moslehi, 2011). In Hassler, Storesletten, and Zilibotti's (2007) model,
tax revenue is spent either on public goods or pensions because of the specication of
the utility function. In Creedy and Moslehi (2009) and Creedy, Li, and Moslehi (2011),
the two programs are provided in equilibrium, but the analysis is simplied by assuming
either a vote on public goods for a given pension provision rule (Creedy and Moslehi,
2009), or a vote on public pensions for a given public goods provision rule (Creedy, Li,
and Moslehi, 2011). In other words, the two-dimensional voting aspect is reduced to one-
dimensional voting. In addition, these previous studies have no endogenous mechanism
for capital accumulation. In contrast, this study demonstrates how voting determines
both the government's size and the composition of its spending, and how these in turn
aect capital accumulation in the presence of intergenerational conict.1
The second is the literature on the political economy of pensions and aging. Gonzalez-
Eiras and Niepelt (2008) show that in a neoclassical growth framework, the aggregate
pension spending-to-GDP ratio increases as the population ages, while per-retiree pension
spending-to-GDP ratio shows a hump-shaped pattern. The present study shows that in
an endogenous growth framework with alternative public spending, the former prediction
holds, but the latter fails under empirically plausible conditions. This results suggest
that the predicted per-retiree pension depends on the model structure and assumptions.
Therefore, further analysis is necessary to understand the eect of population aging on
per-retiree pension benet, which is important from the lifetime utility viewpoint.
The third is the literature on the political economy of aging and economic growth
(Zhang, Zhang, and Lee, 2003; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2012; Kunze, 2014; Ono
and Uchida, 2015) that focuses on the indirect eect of population aging by examining
changes in policy insturment choices. In particular, Zhang, Zhang, and Lee (2003) and
Kunze (2014) consider a single policy issue, i.e., public education, while Gonzalez-Eiras
and Niepelt (2012) and Ono and Uchida (2014) consider public education and pensions.
The present study follows Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2012) and Ono and Uchida (2014),
but focuses on public goods provision beneting both the young and the elderly rather
than on education beneting only the young. Given this alternative composition of pub-
lic spending, this study demonstrates the political eect of population aging on policy
instrument choice and economic growth.
1Another example of two-issue voting in the presence of intergenerational conict are two types of
income redistribution: redistribution within and between generations (Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2005;
Bassetto, 2008; and Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2008), public capital and social security (Konrad,
1995 and Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 1999); health-care services and social security (Bethencourt and
Galasso, 2008); and public education and social security (Bearse, Glomm, and Janeba, 2001; Soares,
2006; Bernasconi and Profeta, 2012; Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2012; Iturbe-Ormaetxe and Valera,
2012; Kaganovich and Meier, 2012; Kaganovich and Zilcha, 2012; Naito, 2012; Lancia and Russo, 2015;
Ono and Uchida, 2014; Ono, 2015; Uchida, 2015).
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
characterizes an economic equilibrium. Section 3 characterizes a political equilibrium and
investigates the eects of population aging on government spending and economic growth.
Section 4 provides concluding remarks. Proofs are given in the Appendix.
2 The Model and Economic Equilibrium
Consider an innite-horizon economy composed of identical agents, perfectly competitive
rms, and perfect annuity markets. A new generation, called generation t, is born in each
period t = 0; 1; 2; :::: Generation t is composed of a continuum of Nt > 0 identical agents.
We assume that Nt = (1 + n)Nt 1, that is, the net rate of population growth is n >  1.
2.1 Preferences and Utility Maximization
Agents live for a maximum of two periods, youth and old age. In youth, each agent is
endowed with one unit of labor, which is supplied inelastically to rms, and the agent
obtains wages in return. An agent in generation t divides his or her wage wt between his
or her own current consumption cyt ; savings held as an annuity and invested into physical
capital for consumption in old age, st; and tax payments as a proportion of his or her
wage,
 
 bt + 
g
t

wt; where 
b
t is the period-t pension contribution rate and 
g
t is the period-
t tax for the provision of public goods. Thus, the budget constraint for a period-t young
agent is cyt + st  (1   bt    gt )wt.
Agents are assumed to face uncertain lifetimes, such that an agent dies at the end of
youth with a probability of 1  p 2 (0; 1), and lives throughout old age with a probability
of p. If an agent dies young, his or her annuitized wealth is transferred via annuity
markets to the agents who live throughout old age. If an agent is alive in old age, he
or she consumes the returns from savings plus the pay-as-you-go public pension benet.
The budget constraint for a period-t + 1 elderly agent is given by cot+1  ~Rt+1st + bt+1,
where cot+1 is consumption in old age, ~Rt+1 is the return from savings as an annuity, and
bt+1 is the pay-as-you-go public pension benet.
Agents consume private and public goods. We assume additively separable logarithmic
preferences over private and public goods to obtain a closed form solution. The utility of a
young agent in period t is written as (1 ) ln cyt + ln gt+p 

(1  ) ln cot+1 +  ln gt+1
	
,
where gt denotes the per capita period-t public goods provision, (> 0) captures the
preference weight on public goods, and  2 (0; 1) is a discount factor. Thus, the expected
3
utility maximization problem for a period-t young agent can be written as:
max
fcyt ;st;cot+1g
(1  ) ln cyt +  ln gt + p 

(1  ) ln cot+1 +  ln gt+1
	
s.t. cyt + st  (1   bt    gt )wt;
cot+1  ~Rt+1st + bt+1;
given t; wt; bt+1 and ~Rt+1:
Solving the problem leads to the following consumption and saving functions:
cyt =
1
1 + p

(1   bt    gt )wt +
bt+1
~Rt+1

; cot+1 =
p ~Rt+1
1 + p

(1   bt    gt )wt +
bt+1
~Rt+1

; and
st =
p
1 + p

(1   bt    gt )wt  
bt+1
p ~Rt+1

:
Using these functions, the indirect utility functions of the young and the elderly are given
by
V yt = (1 + p) (1  ) ln

(1   bt    gt )wt +
bt+1
~Rt+1

+  ln gt + p ln gt+1
+

(1 + p) (1  ) ln 1
1 + p
+ p(1  ) ln p ~Rt+1

and
V ot = (1  ) ln

~Rtst 1 + bt

+  ln gt;
respectively.
In period 0, there are young agents in generation 0 and the initial elderly agents in
generation  1. Each agent in generation  1 is endowed with s 1 units of goods, earns
the return ~R0s 1 plus pension benet b0, and consumes them. The initial elderly agents'
measure is pN 1. The utility of an agent in generation  1 is (1  ) ln co0 +  ln g0.
2.2 Technology and Prot Maximization
There is a continuum of identical, perfectly competitive, prot-maximizing rms that
produce output with a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb{Douglas production function, Yt =
At(Kt)
(Nt)
1 , where Yt is aggregate output, At is the productivity parameter, Kt is ag-
gregate capital, Nt is aggregate labor, and  2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter representing
capital share. The productivity parameter is assumed to be proportional to the aggregate
capital per labor unit in the overall economy, that is, At = A(Kt=Nt)
1 . Capital invest-
ment thus involves a type of technological externality often used in theories of endogenous
growth (see, for example, Romer, 1986). Capital is assumed to fully depreciate within a
period.
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In each period t, a rm chooses capital and labor to maximize its prots, t =
At(Kt)
(Nt)
1    RtKt   wtNt, where Rt is the rental price of capital and wt is the
wage rate. The rm takes these prices as given. The rst-order conditions for prot-
maximization are given by
Kt : Rt = At(Kt)
 1(Nt)1 ;
Nt : wt = (1  )At(Kt)(Nt) :
2.3 Government Budget Constraints
The government budgets for pensions and public goods are assumed to be balanced in
each period. Fiscal policy is determined through elections. A period-t budget constraint
on pensions is Nt
b
twt = pNt 1bt; and a period-t budget constraint on public goods is
Nt
g
t wt = (Nt + pNt 1) gt: Dividing both sides of these constraints by Nt, we obtain the
per-capita forms of government budget constraints:
 btwt =
p
1 + n
bt and 
g
t wt =

1 +
p
1 + n

gt:
The public good in the present model does not satisfy the non-rivalry property. Ag-
gregate spending to provide public goods, (Nt + pNt 1)gt, implies that per capita public
spending decreases as the population increases. The good is classied as a public good
with congestion. However, we refer to it as a public good hereafter for simplicity. Exam-
ples of public goods with congestion include public education, public facilities like libraries
and swimming pools, and welfare services for the elderly and persons with disabilities. In
theses examples, congestion arises when the demand levels approach a facility's capacity.
2.4 Economic Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for capital is Kt+1 = Ntst, which expresses the equality
of total savings by young agents in generation t, Ntst, to the stock of aggregate physical
capital. Dividing both sides by Nt leads to
(1 + n)kt+1 = st;
where kt  Kt=Nt is per-capita capital. Because the market for capital is competitive,
the following arbitrage condition holds under a perfect annuity:
~Rt+1 = Rt+1=p 8t:
Denition 1. An economic equilibrium is a sequence of prices,
n
wt; Rt; ~Rt
o1
t=0
, allo-
cations, fcyt ; cot ; stg1t=0, capital stock fktg1t=0 with the initial condition k0(> 0), and
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policies f bt ;  gt ; gt; btg1t=0, such that: (i) utility is maximized with the budget con-
straints in youth and old age; (ii) prot is maximized; (iii) the government budget
is constrained; (iv) it meets the capital-market-clearing condition; and (v) there is
no arbitrage condition.
Assuming productive externality, At = A(Kt=Nt)
1 , the rst-order conditions for
prot maximization are:
Rt = R  A and wt = (1  )Akt:
Using the saving function, rst-order conditions for prot maximization, and no arbitrage
condition, we can rewrite the capital-market-clearing condition as:
(1 + n)kt+1 =
p
1 + p

 
1   bt    gt

(1  )Akt   bt+1
R

: (1)
In an economic equilibrium, the indirect utility of a young agent in period t, V yt , and
that of an elderly agent alive in period t, V ot , can be expressed as functions of government
policy and capital stock:
V yt = (1 + p)(1  ) ln

(1   bt    gt )(1  )Akt +
bt+1
R=p

+  ln gt + p ln gt+1;
V ot = (1  ) ln

R
p
(1 + n)kt + bt

+  ln gt;
where some irrelevant terms are omitted from the expressions. The rst term of the young
agent's indirect utility function corresponds to the utility of consumption in youth and
old age; the second and third terms show the utility of the rst- and second-period public
goods, respectively. The rst term of the elderly agent's indirect utility corresponds to
the utility of consumption and the second shows the utility of public goods.
3 Political Equilibrium
This study assumes probabilistic voting to demonstrate the political mechanism. In each
period, the government in power maximizes a political objective function. Formally, the
political objective function in each period t is given by:

t =
p
p+ 1 + n
V ot +
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
V yt ;
where p=(p+ 1+ n) and (1 + n)=(p+ 1+ n) are the relative weights of elderly and young
agents, respectively, measured as a percentage of the population in the economy. The
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government's problem in period t is to maximize 
t subject to its budget constraints,
given the state variable, kt.
2
The scope of this study is restricted to a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium.
Markov perfectness implies that outcomes depend only on the payo-relevant state vari-
able, that is, capital k. The stationary property implies that our focus is on equilibrium
policy rules that do not depend on time. Therefore, the expected levels of public goods
provision and public pensions for the next periods, gt+1 and bt+1, respectively, are given
by functions of the next period's stock of capital, gt+1 = G(kt+1) and bt+1 = B(kt+1),
respectively. Using recursive notation with x0 denoting the next-period x, we can dene
a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium as follows:
Denition 2. A stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium is a set of functions,
hK;T b; T g; G;Bi, where K : <++ ! <++ is a capital accumulation rule, k0 = K(k),
T b : <++ ! [0; 1] is a pension contribution rule,  b = T b(k); T g : <++ ! [0; 1] is a
tax rule,  g = T g(k), G : <++ ! <++ is a government expenditure rule, g = G(k),
and B : <++ ! <+ is a public pension rule, b = B(k), such that the following
conditions hold:
(i) the capital market clears
(1 + n)K(k) =
p
1 + p
 
1  T b(k)  T g(k)  (1  )Ak   B(K(k))
R

; (2)
(ii) hT (k); G(k); B(k)i = argmax
(k; b; g; b0; g0) is subject to g0 = G(k0), b = B(k0), (2),
and the government budget constraints,
 b(1  )Ak = p
1 + n
 b and  g(1  )Ak =

1 +
p
1 + n

 g;
with a non-negativity constraint, b  0, where 
(k; b;  b;  g; g; b0; g0) is dened by

()  p
p+ 1 + n

(1  ) ln

R
p
(1 + n)k + b

+  ln g

+
1 + n
p+ 1 + n

(1 + p)(1  ) ln
 
1   b    g  (1  )Ak + b0
R=p

+  ln g + p ln g0

:
Given that preferences are specied by the logarithmic utility function, we assume
linear policy functions of public goods and public pensions for the next period, G(k0) =
G0  k0 and B(k0) = B0  k0, where G0(> 0) and B0(> 0) are constant parameters. In
this scenario, we solve the problem and determine the political equilibrium outcome as
follows:
2An explicit micro-foundation for this modeling is explained in Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter
3) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, Appendix). Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) outline the
process to derive the political objective function under probabilistic voting in the framework of overlapping
generations.
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Proposition 1. There is a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium distinguished
by b > 0 if  < ^, and b = 0 otherwise, where ^ is dened by
^  1   

1 + n
p
(1 + p) + 1

:
The corresponding policy functions are as follows:
B(k) =
( 
1 
(1+p)+ p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n)

Ak if  < ^;
0 otherwise;
T b(k) =
(
1
1  

(1 ) p
1+n
(1+p)+ p
1+n
  

if  < ^;
0 otherwise;
T g(k) =
8><>:
1
1  
(1+ p1+n)
(1+p)+ p
1+n
if  < ^;
(1+ p1+n)
(1+p)+ p
1+n
otherwise;
G(k) =
8<:

(1+p)+ p
1+n
Ak if  < ^;
(1 )
(1+p)+ p
1+n
Ak otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The result in Proposition 1 in terms of population aging imply the following. The
condition  ? ^, in Proposition 1 implies that for a given n, , , and , there is a critical
value of p, denoted by ~p  max f0; (1 + n)=((1  )=  1  (1 + n))g, such that
B(k) > 0 if p > ~p
B(k) = 0 otherwise.
The condition also implies that for a given p, , , and , there is a critical value of n,
denoted by ~n  f((1  ) =  1) = (1=p+ )g   1, such that
B(k) > 0 if n < ~n
B(k) = 0 otherwise.
This implies that public pensions are more likely to be provided in the political equilibrium
if longevity is higher and/or the population growth rate is lower; that is, if the elderly
have a greater political weight than the young.
To understand the result in Proposition 1 in more detail, recall the policy function of
pensions when  < ^,
B(k) =
26666664
1  
(1 + p|{z}
(a:1)
) +
p
1 + n| {z }
(a:2)
  
p
(1 + n)| {z }
(a:3)
37777775  Ak; (3)
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and the policy functions of public goods,
G(k) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:

(1+ p|{z}
(a:1)
)+
p
1 + n| {z }
(a:2)
Ak if  < ^;
(1 )
(1+ p|{z}
(a:1)
)+
p
1 + n| {z }
(a:2)
Ak otherwise.
(4)
Equation (3) indicates that providing public pensions depends on the three factors
denoted by the terms (a.1), (a.2), and (a.3); and Equation (4) indicates that providing
public goods depends on the factors (a.1) and (a.2), where these terms correspond to those
in Equation (3). The term (a.1) shows the weight of the young's utility of consumption
they will enjoy in their old age. A greater tax burden today implies a lower level of
disposable income, and thus a lower level of old-age consumption. A smaller value of
(a.1) indicates that the young attach a lower weight to the cost of the tax burden in
terms of the utility of consumption. The term (a.2) denotes the factor representing the
pension burden on the young. A lower value of (a.2) shows that the young bear less
burden for nancing public pensions for the elderly.
The term (a.3) denotes the rate of return on savings. The private rate of return
on savings, ~R, is equal to R=p from the arbitrage condition. In addition, savings (s)
is equal to (1 + n)k from the capital market clearing condition. These indicate that
greater longevity and a lower population growth rate lead to a lower return on savings in
equilibrium, thereby incentivizing the elderly to use public pensions more to compensate
for their consumption. Altogether, smaller values for the three terms (the rst two terms)
incentivize politicians to spend more on the currently living elderly by providing public
pensions (public goods).
The following two propositions demonstrate how population growth rate and longevity
aect pensions and public goods provision.
Proposition 2. Suppose  < ^: there is a stationary Markov-perfect political equilibrium
with b > 0.
(i) The pension-to-GDP ratio increases with a lower population growth rate and greater
longevity.
(ii) There is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the population growth rate (or
longevity) and the per-retiree pension-to-GDP ratio, b=y. That is, there are two
critical values, n^ and p^, dened by
1 + n^  p
1 + p
(
1  

1=2
  1
)
2 (0; 1 + ~n) ;
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and
p^ 
"
1  
(1 + n)
1=2
 +
1
1 + n
1=2
 

 +
1
1 + n
# 1
2 (~p; 1) ;
such that @(b=Ak)=@n R 0 if and only if n Q n^ and @(b=Ak)=@p R 0 if and only if
p Q p^.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The rst part of Proposition 2 states that the aggregate pension spending-to-GDP
ratio increases as the population ages; the second part states that the per-retiree pension
spending-to-GDP ratio shows a hump-shaped pattern as the population ages. To un-
derstand the mechanism behind these results, rst consider the period-t pension-to-GDP
ratio, given by:
pNt 1bt
Yt
=
bt
Akt
 p
1 + n
=
0BBBBBB@
1  
(1 + p|{z}
(a:1)
) +
p
1 + n| {z }
(a:2)
  
p
(1 + n)| {z }
(a:3)
1CCCCCCA 
p
1 + n| {z }
(a:4)
: (5)
The ratio is aected by a lower population growth rate and agents' greater longevity in
four ways. First, greater longevity implies that the current young attach a larger weight
to their utility of consumption and public goods in old age. Thus, they have an incentive
to cut spending on public pensionss for the current elderly and save for their own future
consumption and public goods spending. Therefore, greater longevity has a negative eect
on the b=Ak ratio. This eect is observed by the term (a.1) in Eq. (5).
Second, a lower population growth rate and greater longevity imply a larger tax burden
on the working population (i.e., the young). In particular, the marginal cost of additional
spending on public pensions increases as the population growth rate decreases and/or
longevity increases. In response to an aging population, the government attempts to cut
spending on public pensions to maximize the political objective function. This negative
eect on the b=Ak ratio is observed by the term (a.2) in Eq. (5).
Third, a lower population growth rate and greater longevity imply a decrease in re-
turns from savings. In other words, the return from one unit of savings declines, so
old-age consumption decreases as the population ages. A decrease in returns from savings
incentivizes the government to increase public pension provisions to maintain the elderly's
consumption level. This positive eect is observed by the term (a.3) in Eq. (5).
Finally, a lower population growth rate and greater longevity lead to a higher depen-
dency ratio, and thus a higher pension-to-GDP ratio. This positive eect is observed by
the term (a.4) in Eq. (5). Therefore, there are two negative eects via (a.1) and (a.2), and
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two positive eects via (a.3) and (a.4). The result in Proposition 2(i) shows that the latter
always outweighs the former in the political equilibrium. This result is consistent with
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt's (2008) model prediction using a neoclassical growth frame-
work. The present analysis indicates that their prediction also holds in an endogenous
growth model in the presence of an alternative channel of government spending.
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) also predicted an inverse U-shaped relationship
between pension payments per retiree and the share of the elderly in the population. To
investigate whether our framework produces a similar outcome, we focus on the per-retiree
pension-to-GDP ratio, b=Ak. Given that output grows at a constant rate, an inverse U-
shaped relationship between b=Ak and n (or p) is a necessary condition for Gonzalez-Eiras
and Niepelt's (2008) argument to hold in our framework. Figure 1 illustrates numerical
examples.
[Figure 1 here.]
Equation (5) suggests that there are three eects from population aging on the b=Ak
ratio via (a.1), (a.2), and (a.3). The result in Proposition 2(ii) indicates that there is
a critical value of x(= n; p), denoted by x^(= n^; p^), such that the three eects balance
x^(= n^; p^). In other words, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between b=Ak and x
around the critical value x^. The b=Ak ratio rst increases in response to a decrease in n
(or an increase in p), but then decreases when n falls below (p exceeds) its critical value.
Therefore, our model produces a similar result to that reported by Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt (2008), provided that the positive eect via capital growth is relatively small.
However, our numerical result indicates that the second phenomenon is less likely to
occur for empirically plausible sets of parameters, as demonstrated in Figure 1. Panel (a)
demonstrates that the ratio always increases in response to an increase in longevity for
the range 0 < p < 1; and Panel (b) demonstrates that the b=Ak ratio increases in response
to a decrease in the population growth rate, as long as the gross population growth rate,
1 + n, is above zero. These results are qualitatively unchanged, even if we remove the
eect via the choice of an alternative channel of spending (i.e., public goods) by setting 
close to zero (see the graph for the case of  = 0:001). Therefore, the results indicate that
there is a political factor that reduces the pressure from the elderly, but in our framework,
the political factor is not sucient to overcome the pressure.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The result in Proposition 2 indicates that given the budget constraint, the government
may also change public goods spending in response to population aging. We next consider
this issue and obtain the following result:
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Proposition 3. Consider the ratio of government spending (on public goods) to GDP
ratio. (i) An increase in longevity pleads to a decrease in theg=Ak : @(g=Ak)=@p < 0
ratio. (ii) A decrease in the population growth rate leads to a decrease in theg=Ak :
@(g=Ak)=@n > 0 ratio.
Proof. The result is obvious from Eq. (4).
The ratio of government spending on public goods to GDP is also aected by a lower
population growth rate and agents' greater longevity. Equation (4) indicates that an
aging population aects the g=Ak ratio via (a.1) and (a.2). These terms correspond to
those observed in the b=Ak ratio in Eq. (3), both of which have a negative impact on
the ratio. Therefore, a lower population growth rate and greater longevity denitely
lead to a decrease in the g=Ak ratio. The results in Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that
under empirically plausible conditions, population aging induces the government to shift
spending from public goods to public pensions at the aggregate and individual levels.
The result in Proposition 1 enables a derivation of the growth rate of per capita capital,
k0=k, and to investigate how population aging aects the growth rate. The following
proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 4.
(i) The growth rate of per capita capital is
k0
k
=
8<:
k0
k

b>0
 (1 +p)
(1+n)f(1+p)+ p1+ng+ 1  A if  < ^;
k0
k

b=0
 1
1+n
 p
1+p
 1 +p
(1+p)+ p
1+n
 (1  )A if   ^:
(ii) Greater longevity leads to a higher growth rate of per capita capital: @ (k0=k) =@p > 0;
a lower population growth rate also leads to a higher growth rate of per capita capital:
@ (k0=k) =@n < 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The growth rate of per capita capital is constant over time because the model exhibits
a constant interest rate inherited from AK technology. To see the eect of population
aging on economic growth, let us rst recall the growth rate of per capita capital when
b > 0,
k0
k

b>0


0@1   + (b:1)z}|{p
1A
(1 + n)
8>><>>:(1 + p|{z}(b:2) ) +
p
1 + n| {z }
(b:3)
9>>=>>;+ 1 
A:
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Thus, the growth rate is aected by population aging via the three factors denoted by
(b:1), (b:2), and (b:3) in the expression above. To understand the roles of these factors
more precisely, consider the disposable income of the young, calculated as follows:
(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k) =
1 
(b:1)z }| {

1 + p
1 + 1
1+ p|{z}
(b:2)
 p
1 + n| {z }
(b:3)
;
where the terms (b:1), (b:2), and (b:3) correspond to those in the growth rate equation.
These three terms have several implications for economic growth. Greater longevity
leads to a larger weight for the utility of future public goods and that of old-age con-
sumption, as observed in (b:1) and (b:2), respectively. These terms incentivize agents to
save more for future public goods provision and consumption, and thus promote economic
growth. However, greater longevity and a lower population growth rate increase the tax
burden on the young to provide public pensions, and thus, lowers economic growth, as
observed in (b:3). These two opposing eects imply that population aging has mixed
growth eects, but the net eect is positive when public pensions are provided.
Population aging also increases the growth rate when no public pensions are provided.
To see this eect more precisely, recall the growth rate of per capita capital when b = 0,
k0
k

b=0
 1
1 + n| {z }
(b:4)
 p
1 + p| {z }
(b:5)
 1   +
(b:1)z}|{
p
(1 + p|{z}
(b:2)
) + 
p
1 + n| {z }
(b:3)
 (1  )A:
The terms (b:1), (b:2), and (b:3) correspond to those in the growth rate equation when
b > 0. In the present case, population aging has two additional eects. First, a lower
population growth rate increases per capita capital equipment in the economy|this ef-
fect is observed in the term (b:4). Second, increased longevity increases the weight of
old-age consumption and thus increases the savings rate|this eect is observed in the
term (b:5). These two additional eects also have positive impacts on capital accumu-
lation. Therefore, population aging promotes economic growth when no public pensions
are provided.
The result in Proposition 4 is in sharp contrast to the widely accepted view of economic
growth in an aging economy: population aging increases the dependency ratio and the
burden on the young, thereby producing a negative income eect on savings. In addition,
pension benets give the young a disincentive to save for old-age consumption. From these
two negative eects on savings, population aging is expected to hamper economic growth
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in the long run. Pecchenino and Pollard (1997) and Futagami and Nakajima (2002) focus
on the direct eect of aging on savings and economic growth in an environment where
policy instruments are exogenously given, and show that the aforementioned argument is
not necessary true. Our study focuses on the direct and indirect eects using endogenous
policy choices in voting, and shows that population aging denitely accelerates capital
accumulation and economic growth across time periods. The results therefore suggest
that endogenous policy response is an important factor when evaluating the eect of
population aging on economic growth.
4 Concluding Remarks
This study attempted to determine how an aging population aects voting on pensions
and public goods expenditure, and how this expenditure in turn aects economic growth
using an overlapping-generation model in which government expenditures are nanced by
tax on the working young. Furthermore, expenditures are determined via probabilistic
voting that captures the intergenerational conict caused by population aging. The results
sow that population aging results in higher spending on pensions and lower spending on
public goods, but does not hamper economic growth.
The result depends on a commonly used model specication of a logarithmic utility
function. An analytical solution is still available for the utility function with a constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, as long as the interest rate is constant across
periods, a result stemming from AK technology. However, additional eects may appear
because income and substitution eects do not cancel each other out in this type of
utility function. Therefore, the remaining task is to check the robustness of the result in
a generalized utility function setting, a task left for future research.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that public pensions are provided in equilibrium in the next period, b0 > 0.
Suppose linear policy functions of public goods and public pensions for the next period,
G(k0) = G0  k0 and B(k0) = B0  k0, where G0(> 0) and B0(> 0) are constant parameters.
Given this assumtion and government budget constraints, the capital market clearing
condition in Denition 2 becomes
(1 + n)k0 =
p
1 + p


(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)  B0k
0
R

;
which is rewritten as
k0 =
p
1+p
(1 + n) + pB0
(1+p)R


(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

: (6)
Using (6) and the assumption B(k0) = B0 k0, we can write the present value of lifetime
income as
(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k) +
B(k0)
R=p
=
"
1 +
B0
R=p

p
1+p
(1 + n) + pB0
(1+p)R
#


(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

:
(7)
Equations (6) and (7) enable us to write the political objective function as follows:

 =
p
p+ 1 + n
(1  ) ln

R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)

+  lnG(k)
+
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
(1   + p) ln

(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

;
where the terms unrelated to political decisions are omitted from the expression.
The rst-order conditions with respect to B(k) and G(k) are given by
B(k) :
1  
R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)
=
(1   + p)
(1  )Ak    1 + p
1+n

G(k)  p
1+n
B(k)
; (8)
G(k) :

G(k)
=
(1   + p)
(1  )Ak    1 + p
1+n

G(k)  p
1+n
B(k)
;
respectively. These conditions lead to the following relationship between B(k) and G(k) :
1  
R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)
=

G(k)
: (9)
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Equations (8) and (9) are rewritten as
(1  )

(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

= (1   + p)

R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)

;
(10)
G(k) =

1  

R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)

; (11)
respectively.
Plugging (11) into (10), we have
(1  )

(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n


1  

R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)

  p
1 + n
B(k)

= (1   + p)

R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)

;
or 
1 +
p
1 + n

 +
p
1 + n
(1  ) + (1   + p)

B(k)
=

(1  )(1  )A 

1 +
p
1 + n


R
p
(1 + n)  (1   + p)R
p
(1 + n)

k:
Recalling that R = A, this expression is reduced to
B(k) =
"
1  
(1 + p) + p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n)
#
 Ak: (12)
Equation (12) indicates a political equilibrium with b > 0 if and only if the following
condition holds:
 < ^  1   

1 + n
p
(1 + p) + 1

: (13)
Substituting (12) into (9) leads to the policy function of public goods when b > 0.
G(k) =

(1 + p) + p
1+n
Ak: (14)
Therefore, when  < ^, (12) and (14) constitute a stationary Markov-perfect equilibrium
if B0 =
h
1 
(1+p)+ p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n)
i
A and G0 =
h

(1+p)+ p
1+n
i
A.
We substitute (12) and (14) into the government budget constraints to obtain equi-
librium  b and  g, as follows:
 b =
1
1   
 
(1  ) p
1+n
(1 + p) + p
1+n
  
!
and  g =
1
1   
   1 + p
1+n

(1 + p) + p
1+n
;
where  b 2 (0; 1) and  g 2 (0; 1) hold under condition (13). The result so far is summarized
in the following lemma.
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 Lemma A1. Suppose  < ^. There is a stationary Markov-perfect political equilib-
rium such that T b(k); T g(k); G(k), and B(k) are given by:
T b(k) =
1
1   
 
(1  ) p
1+n
(1 + p) + p
1+n
  
!
2 (0; 1);
T g(k) =
1
1   
   1 + p
1+n

(1 + p) + p
1+n
2 (0; 1);
G(k) =

(1 + p) + p
1+n
Ak > 0;
B(k) =
 
1  
(1 + p) + p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n)
!
Ak > 0;
respectively.
Alternatively, when public pensions are not provided in the next period, we assume
the following policy functions:
B(k0) = B1k = 0 and G(k0) = G1  k0:
With this inference, the capital market clearing condition in Denition 2 becomes:
(1 + n)k0 =
p
1 + p

(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

(15)
and the policy function of future public goods becomes:
G(k0) = G0
p
(1 + n) (1 + p)

(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

:
Therefore, the political objective function is given by:

 =
p
p+ 1 + n
(1  ) ln

R
p
(1 + n)k +B(k)

+  lnG(k)
+
1 + n
p+ 1 + n
(1   + p) ln

(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

:
The rst-order conditions with respect to B(k) and G(k) are:
B(k) = 0 if
1  
R
p
(1 + n)k
 1   + p
(1  )Ak    1 + p
1+n

G(k)
; (16)
G(k) :

G(k)
=
1   + p
(1  )Ak    1 + p
1+n

G(k)
;
respectively, where B(k) is set to zero in both conditions. The rst-order condition with
respect to G(k) when B(k) = 0 is rewritten as:
G(k) =
(1  )
(1 + p) +  p
1+n
Ak: (17)
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Substituting (17) into (16) provides the following condition for B(k) = 0:
b = 0 if   ^:
Therefore, when   ^, B(k) = 0, and (17), they constitute a stationary Markov-perfect
equilibrium, provided that B1 = 0 and G1 =

(1 )
(1+p)+ p
1+n

A. The contribution rate  b
and tax rate  g are determined by setting B(k) = B(k0) = 0 and G(k) in (17) in the
following government budget constraints:
 b = 0 and  g =

 
1 + p
1+n

(1 + p) + p
1+n
2 (0; 1):
The result so far is summarized in the following lemma.
 Lemma A2. Suppose   ^. There is a stationary Markov-perfect political equilib-
rium such that T b(k); T g(k); G(k), and B(k) are given by:
T b(k) = 0;
T g(k) =

 
1 + p
1+n

(1 + p) + p
1+n
2 (0; 1);
G(k) =
(1  )
(1 + p) +  p
1+n
Ak;
B(k) = 0;
respectively.
The results in Lemmata 1 and 2 are summarized as the statement in Proposition 1.

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
(i) The aggregate pension payment in period t is pNt 1bt. The pension-to-GDP ratio in
period t is therefore:
pNt 1bt
Yt
=
pNt 1bt
(AKt=Nt)Nt
=
pbt
A(1 + n)kt
:
Plugging the policy function B(k) into the expression above, we obtain
bt
Akt
 p
1 + n
=
 
1  
(1 + p) + p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n)
!
 p
1 + n
=
1  
(1 + n)

1
p
+ 

+ 1
  ;
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indicating that @ (pbt=(1 + n)AKt) =@n < 0 and @ (pbt=(1 + n)AKt) =@p > 0 for all t.
(ii) Equation (3) implies that when b > 0, the ratio b=Ak is given by:
b
Ak
=
1  
(1 + p) + p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n):
Dierentiating b=Ak with respect to p yields
@b=Ak
@p
=
( 1) (1  )
(1 + p) + p
1+n
2  + 11 + n

+

(p)2
(1 + n);
implying that @ (b=Ak) =@p R 0, p Q p^.
Dierentiating b=Ak with respect to n yields
@b=Ak
@n
=
1  
(1 + p) + p
1+n
2  p(1 + n)2   p ;
implying that @ (b=Ak) =@n R 0, 1 + n Q 1 + n^.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Suppose b > 0. Recall Eq. (6) in Appendix A1, which expresses the capital market
clearing condition when b > 0:
k0 =
p
1+p
(1 + n) + pB0
(1+p)R| {z }
(c:1)


(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k)

| {z }
(c:2)
:
Given that B0 =
n
1 
(1+p)+ p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n)
o
A holds, the term (c.1) in the above expression
is rewritten as
(1 + n) +
pB0
(1 + p)R
= (1 + n) +
p
(1 + p)R
(
1  
(1 + p) + p
1+n
  
p
(1 + n)
)
A
=
(1 + n)p

(1 + p) + p
1+n
	
+ p

(1  )
(1 + p)

(1 + p) + p
1+n
	 :
Using the policy function from Lemma A1, the term (c.2) is reformulated as:
(1  )Ak  

1 +
p
1 + n

G(k)  p
1 + n
B(k) =
1   + p
(1 + p) + p
1+n
Ak:
Therefore, the capital market clearing condition when b > 0 is rewritten as:
k0
k
=
 (1   + p)
(1 + n)

(1 + p) + p
1+n
	
+ 1 

 A:
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Alternatively, suppose b = 0. Recall Eq. (15) in Appendix A1, which expresses the
capital market clearing condition when b = 0. Plugging in the policy function demon-
strated in Lemma A2, we can rewrite Eq. (15) as
k0
k
=
1
1 + n
 p
1 + p
 1   + p
(1 + p) +  p
1+n
 (1  )A;
where the second line is derived by substituting the policy function G(k) when b = 0.
Therefore, the economic growth rate is summarized in Proposition 4(i).
(ii) It is obvious from the expression in Proposition 4(i) that @ (k0=k) =n < 0 for both
b > 0 and b = 0. When b > 0, dierentiating k0=k with respect to p yields
@
 
k0=kjb>0

@p
= A


(1 + n)

(1 + p) + p
1+n
	
+ 1 

  (1   + p) (1 + n)   + 1
1+n

(1 + n)

(1 + p) + p
1+n
	
+ 1 

2
= ()2A
 
1

  1 (1  ) + (1 + n)
(1 + n)

(1 + p) + p
1+n
	
+ 1 

2
> 0;
where the inequality in the third line comes from  < 1 and  < 1.
When b = 0, the growth rate is rewritten as:
k0
k

b=0
 
1 + n
 1 

1+p
1
p
+  + 
1+n
 (1  )A;
indicating that @ k0=kjb=0 =@p > 0:

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?p < 1
(a)
1 + n > 1
(b)
Figure 1: Parameter values are set at  = (0:95)30 and  = 0:25 in both panels. We
assume a generation to be 30 years, and a single-period discount rate given by 0:95. In
Panel (a), we assume 1+n = 1 and illustrate the eect of longevity (p) on the b=Ak ratio.
In Panel (b), we assume p = 0:8 and illustrate the eect of the gross population growth
rate (1 + n), on the b=Ak ratio. For each panel, we illustrate three cases,  = 0:0001, 0:2,
and 0:3.
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